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TORTS
tort of bad faith do not lend support for recognizing this new
cause of action. The duty to deal fairly and in good faith to-
ward the insured arises from the contract of insurance and is
based upon a fiduciary relationship. In an excess judgment
case the duty to settle is implied in law to protect the insured
from exposure to a judgment in excess of policy limits. 06 It is
implied because the insured gives up total control to the in-
surer and there is an ensuing conflict of interest.
None of the aforementioned principles underlying the rec-
ognition of the tort of bad faith could logically be viewed to
offer a basis for sanctioning a direct third-party claimant bad
faith action against an insurer. Therefore, a clear signal was
sent to all interested parties: the Wisconsin Supreme Court
will not recognize a cause of action based on a duty to deal
fairly and in good faith which runs to and protects third-party
claimants.
NANCY J. RICE
SECURITIES LAW - Sale of Business by Transfer
of 100% of Corporate Stock Not Governed by Securi-
ties Laws. Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981).
The accelerating momentum of corporate acquisitions has
yielded a persistent legal issue which, despite thorough litiga-
tion, still lacks final resolution. The question is whether the
federal securities laws are controlling when parties execute the
sale of an incorporated business by means of a transfer of
100% of the corporate stock. Prior to 1970, it was customary
to assume that sale of an existing incorporated business entity
via a transfer of stock would fall within the purview of the
federal securities laws." However, in subsequent lawsuits de-
106. 23 Cal. 3d at 893, 592 P.2d at 337, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 850 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
1. See, e.g., Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365
U.S. 870 (1961), where defendant selling 100% of corporate stock contested federal
jurisdiction, contending that the federal securities laws exclude private transactions
taking place independently of the national exchanges. There was no allegation that
stock was not a security.
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fendants charged with securities violations in the federal
courts have argued that the courts did not have "subject mat-
ter jurisdiction" for the type of sale transaction in question.2
Parties have often insisted that, although the term "stock" is
specifically listed within the statutory definitions, corporate
stock acquired incident to the purchase of a business is not a
"security" within the meaning of either the Securities Act of
1933 ('33 Act)3 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34
Act).4
The resolution of this jurisdictional issue will impact upon
both the judicial forum and the scope of remedies available to
the plaintiff. For example, federal rules of procedure are often
more advantageous than state rules.5 Since courts have liber-
ally construed the antifraud provisions of the '34 Act and
2. The Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act) provides for concurrent state jurisdiction.
15 U.S.C. § 77r (1976). However, this case analysis is limited to questions involving
the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Jurisdiction for lawsuits brought under the '33
Act is provided for by § 22 of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1976). If jurisdiction exists
over the federal securities claims, then the court may exercise jurisdiction over any
pendent state-law causes of action. See, e.g., Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233,
1241-42 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970); Smith v. Manuasa, 385 F. Supp.
443, 446 (E.D. Ky. 1974).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976). The term "security" is defined as follows:
When used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires -
(1) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, de-
benture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate
or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certifi-
cate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil,
gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument com-
monly known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or intermim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or
right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. §77b(1) (1976).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976). The definition of "security" pursuant to
§ 78c(a)(10) of this act is similar to the definition stated in the '33 Act. The Supreme
Court has treated the two definitions synonymously. See United Housing Found., Inc.
v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847 n.12 (1975); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14
(1934). The American Law Institute's consolidated Federal Securities Code does not
substantially change the definiton of a security. See FED. SEC. CODE § 202(150)
(1980). For purposes of this analysis, the definitions will be treated as functionally
identical.
5. The '34 Act provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction and has broad venue and
nationwide service of process provisions. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976). Also, attorneys' fees
may be recovered by the successful litigant. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375, 389-97 (1970).
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have required a lesser burden of proof than under common
law theories of recovery, the application of federal securities
law is often favorable to the plaintiff."
Currently, eleven reported federal cases have considered
whether the transfer of stock incident to the sale of a business
falls within federal securities laws.7 However, prior to Freder-
iksen v. Poloway,8 only two appellate courts had addressed
this issue, each reaching an opposite result.9 In Frederiksen,
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals gave additional support
to the position that a security is not involved in such sale
transactions. Thus, courts and litigants await the birth of a
single, functioning standard for determining whether the sale
of a business via the transfer of 100 % of the stock is a securi-
ties transaction.
I. CASE ANALYSIS
The factual situation in Frederiksen involved the sale of a
boat marina wherein the purchaser received 100% of the
6. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (reliance
on misrepresentations not a prerequisite to recovery); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d
1332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978) (improper motive no longer re-
quired); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965) (nondisclosure of ma-
terial information is actionable); SEC v. Penn Central Co., 450 F. Supp. 908 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (proximate causation required).
7. Frederiksen v. Poloway, 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3006
(1981); Coffin v. Publishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 868 (1979); Chandler v. Kew, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 96,966 (10th Cir. April 19, 1977); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan &
Assocs., 496 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974); Ellis v. Hender-
son, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,722 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 24,
1980); Mifflin Energy Sources, Inc. v. Brooks, 501 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Pa. 1980);
Dueker v. Turner, (1979-80 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. RaP. (CCH) 97,386 (N.D.
Ga. Dec. 28, 1979); Titsch Printing, Inc. v. Hastings, 456 F. Supp. 445 (D. Colo. 1978);
Bula v. Mansfield, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RaE. (CCH) 1 96,964 (D. Colo.
May 13, 1977); Bronstein v. Bronstein, 407 F. Supp. 925 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Bailey v.
Meister Brau, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 539 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
8. 637 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017 (1981).
9. In Chandler v. Kew, Inc., [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 1
96,666 (10th Cir. April 19, 1977), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court finding that the sale of a liquor store, with the incidental transfer of
stock, was a mere indicia of ownership and did not constitute the sale of a "security."
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently held that the
purchase of a business entity which includes the receipt of 100% of the stock of the
company falls within the purview of the federal securities laws as the sale of a "secur-
ity." Coffin v. Polishing Machs., Inc., 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
868 (1979); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assocs., 496 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974).
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stock of the acquired close corporation.10 During the months
of August through October, 1978, Jeffery E. Frederiksen and
Emerald City Corporation (ECC) negotiated for and then pur-
chased the assets and stock of North Shore Marina, Inc.
(NSM). NSM was in the business of selling, servicing and pro-
viding storage facilities for boats at its location in Waukegan,
Illinois. The negotiations produced four separate yet interre-
lated agreements, which were signed by Mr. Frederiksen, in
his capacity as president and sole shareholder of ECC, and by
Edward Poloway, in his capacity as president and sole share-
holder of NSM, as well as in his individual capacity."' The
agreement package included a number of provisions," includ-
ing employment s and management agreements.14
10. No satisfactory all-purpose definition of a close corporation appears to have
ever been devised. However, common characteristics of such corporations are: (1) a
small number of stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock; (3) a sub-
stantial majority stockholder participation in the management, direction and opera-
tions of the corporation. 1 F. O'NEAL & G. PAYNE, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.02 (2d ed.
Supp. June 1981).
11. 637 F.2d at 1148.
12. As summarized by the Frederiksen court, id. at 1149, the package included
the following:
1. A purchase agreement, whereby ECC agreed to purchase the assets of
NSM at a purchase price of $191,800 to be paid as follows: $160,000 was to be
paid into an escrow account for use in paying all existing debts of NSM, as well
as any unknown liabilities that might arise; the balahce of $31,800 was to be
paid in equal monthly installments over a three-year period beginning with the
date of closing.
2. A stock purchase and voting trust agreement, which provided that in
exchange for $10 Mr. Poloway would sell 10% of the issued and outstanding
stock of NSM to ECC; for an additional $10 consideration the remaining 90%
of the stock would be transferred into a voting trust controlled by Mr.
Frederiksen.
3. An employment agreement, wherein ECC would employ Mr. Poloway for
a five-year period to "'assist, guide and give his expertise'" in all areas of
ECC's business. Id. Mr. Poloway was to perform within the "'goals, guidelines,
directives, policies and procedures'" set forth by ECC in return for an annual
salary of $32,000. Id. Additional compensation to Mr. Poloway included a con-
sultant fee and a 20% commission on brokerage sales and the sale of new boats
and accessories.
4. A management agreement, which granted ECC authority to operate and
manage the marina facilities. ECC was to receive 50% of the gross income de-
rived from the operation of the pavilion at the Waukegan marina. All expenses
incurred by ECC in such operations were to be deducted from the remaining
50% of gross income, and the remaining balance was to be paid to NSM.
13. Included in the employment contract was a noncompetition agreement under
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ECC terminated its employment agreement with Mr.
Poloway approximately seven months subsequent to the sign-
ing of the acquisition agreements. Soon after this termination,
Mr. Poloway filed suit against ECC and Mr. Frederiksen in
the Circuit Court of Lake County, Illinois, alleging breach of
contract and fraud.1 5
ECC and Mr. Frederiksen, the plaintiffs in the federal ac-
tion, filed their complaint in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois exactly eleven months fol-
lowing the closing date of the sale transaction. The crux of
their complaint was that the interests they acquired in NSM
were "securities" within the purview of the federal securities
laws, and that in connection with the sale of those interests
Mr. Poloway had failed to disclose or had misrepresented cer-
tain material facts. In seeking recovery of $1,250,000 in actual
damages and lost profits, the plaintiffs claimed the defendant
had violated both the '33 and '34 Acts. The plaintiffs also as-
serted pendent claims for common law fraud, breach of con-
tract and breach of Illinois securities laws.16
The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ba-
sis of three primary premises: (1) that the federal court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction because there was no diversity of
citizenship and because the acquisition of NSM did not in-
volve a "security" within the purview of the securities laws,
(2) that the plaintiffs' complaint failed to plead the fraud
claim with sufficient particularity, and (3) that Mr. Frederik-
sen was an improper party to the action.17 The district court
granted Mr. Poloway's motion and dismissed the suit. The
plaintiffs appealed this ruling.
which Mr. Poloway agreed not to compete within a 75-mile radius of Waukegan for a
period of two years following the termination of his employment with ECC. ECC
agreed to pay Mr. Poloway $54,000 for this agreement. (R., Complaint, Exhibit C, I
10).
14. It was understood by the parties that in all probability there would be no
remaining income to be paid NSM under the management agreement described
supra note 11. Frederiksen, 637 F.2d at 1149; R., Complaint, Exhibit A, 16.
15. 637 F.2d at 1149.
16. Id. The plaintiffs argued in their brief that the securities laws should be pre-
sumed to apply because the allegations in their complaint should be taken as true for
purposes of a motion to dismiss. Id. at 1150 n.1. The court rejected this argument,
stating that the rule cited by the plaintiffs did not apply to conclusions of law and
"unwarranted deductions of fact." Id.
17. Id. at 1149.
19821
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
A. Purpose of Securities Acts
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis
by examining the purposes and policies behind the securities
laws, citing the leading case of United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman.18 In holding that the shares of stock involved
were not within the meaning of "securities" under the federal
laws, the Forman Court asserted that the primary purpose of
the '33 and '34 Acts was to eliminate serious abuses in a
largely unregulated securities market and "prevent fraud and
to protect the interest of investors."'19
This view appears to be consistent with the Acts' legisla-
tive histories.20 The emphasis of the federal securities law is
on capital transactions rather than those of a commercial na-
ture. After lengthy committee hearings and extensive debate,
Congress enacted the federal securities provisions to remedy
the practices and abuses which precipitated the stock market
crash of October, 1929.21 A two-fold policy was implemented.
The initial stage represented an attempt to place investors on
"equal footing" with respect to investment decisions. This was
accomplished by 'requiring full disclosure of all material infor-
mation concerning the issuer-seller and the value of the of-
fered security.2 The second segment was an effort to prevent
18. 421 U.S. 837 (1975). Fifty-seven residents of Co-City, a massive cooperative
project in New York City, filed an action for fraud under the federal securities laws.
The respondents had been required to purchase "stock" in the housing corporation in
order to acquire co-op units and alleged that the information bulletin issued at the
initial stages of the project misrepresented the co-op's policy regarding absorption by
the developers of future cost increases due to such factors as inflation.
19. Id. at 849.
20. For a comprehensive history of the '33 and '34 Acts, see J. ELLENBERGER & E.
MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE SECURITIES EX-
CHANGE AcT OF 1934 (1973); see also 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 119-21 (2d ed.
1961).
21. In a message to Congress dated March 29, 1933, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt stated: "[T]his proposal ... puts the burden of telling the whole truth on
the seller. It should give impetus to honest dealing in securities and thereby bring
back public confidence." 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 93 (S. Rosenman ed. 1938).
22. SEC v. Galaxy Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D. N.Y.), aff'd, 556 F.2d 559
(2d Cir. 1974). See generally James, The Securities Act of 1933, 32 MICH. L. REV.
624, 624-30 (1934); Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 30 (1959).
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further exploitation of the public by misrepresentation
through the sale of fraudulent and worthless securities.2"
B. Scope of Securities Laws
In an attempt to delimit the scope of the federal securities
laws, the Frederiksen court declared that the key test is
"whether the transaction is primarily for commercial (i.e., mo-
tivated by a desire to use, consume, occupy or develop), or for
investment purposes. '24 Citing Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce Trust Co. v. Fingland25 and Emisco Industries,
Inc. v. Pro's, Inc.2" for support, the court elevated substance
over form to analyze the underlying economic realities of the
transaction.
A careful reading of Emisco reveals that the Seventh Cir-
cuit determined that the key to the identification of a "secur-
ity" under the '34 Act is in the commercial/consumer versus
investment dichotomy. 27 This echoes the ruling of the Forman
Court, which emphasized that the securities laws do not apply
when the goal of the purchaser is not investment but rather
"a desire to use or consume the item purchased . *."..8
Although not addressed by the Frederiksen court, it
should be stressed that the emphasis on placing substance
over form for purposes of determining coverage under the fed-
eral securities laws must be rigorously tempered by the con-
sideration accorded the reasonable expectations of the inves-
tor. The Supreme Court has specified that the criteria to be
applied in determining the existence of a security must
include:
23. H. R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1934); see El Khadem v. Equity
Secs. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224, 1227 n.7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974). See
generally Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and The Investment Advis-
ers Act of 1940, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 214, 216-17 (1959).
24. 637 F.2d at 1150.
25. 615 F.2d 465, 470 (7th Cir. 1980). The court affirmed the dismissal of a securi-
ties action for lack of jurisdiction because the complaint regarding bank certificates of
deposit did not plead securities fraud where it "'simply describe[d] a victim whose
currency was being held in a commercial transaction and not a victim-investor aspir-
ing for profits.'"
26. 543 F.2d 38 (7th Cir. 1976). The suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
when the note given as part of a sale of all assets of a corporation was deemed not to
be an investment where there was no reliance on efforts of others to produce profits.
27. Id. at 40.
28. 421 U.S. at 852-53.
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[W]hat character the instrument is given in commerce by
the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the eco-
nomic inducements held out to the prospect. In enforcement
of [the federal act], it is not inappropriate that promoters'
offerings be judged as being what they were represented to
be.29
An economic analysis of the facts in Frederiksen suggests
that ECC was not "investing" in NSM in the statutory sense.
The Seventh Circuit recognized this in its statement that the
' stock' sale was a method used to vest ECC with ownership
of [the] business" rather than an investment in securities.30
Consistently with this analysis, the court affirmed the district
court's determination that the transaction was of a commer-
cial nature, and was therefore not within the scope of the fed-
eral securities laws.
C. Literal Application
The plaintiffs attempted to justify application of the fed-
eral securities laws by advocating that the court follow the
holding of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in For-
man.3' There, the court adopted the "literal approach"
whereby the mere use of the term "stock" in connection with
the transaction automatically triggered application of federal
securities provisions. It was asserted that a legal presumption
that a security was sold arose upon the use of the word
''stock."
The Frederiksen court temperately rebutted the plaintiffs'
argument in a four-tier sequence. The initial pitfall noted was
that the language in the '33 and '34 Acts was more narrowly
drawn than the plaintiffs contended. The definition of "secur-
ity" in both Acts is prefaced by the phrase "unless the context
otherwise requires. "32 This "rubber" clause has been con-
strued to affect the burden of proof requirement. Where the
word "requires" has been stressed, the burden of showing this
29. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352-53 (1943), noted in 12
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 494 (1944) and 17 S. CAL. L. REv. 324 (1944).
30. 637 F.2d at 1151.
31. Forman v. Community Servs., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246, 1252 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd
sub nom. United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975). Accord, 1050
Tenants Corp. v. Jakobson, 503 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1974).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976).
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"requirement" is placed upon the litigant asserting that the
statutory language should not be interpreted literally.3 3 On
the other hand, a looser reading of "requires" does not neces-
sitate a shifting of the burden.'
The second segment of the court's attack upon the plain-
tiffs' "literal approach" was directed at the proper basis for
delimiting the reach of the statute. The court declared that
the theoretical sweep of a statute is not necessarily governed
solely by the statutory terms.35
Thirdly, the court recognized that there was significant
case law which explicitly discarded the literal application of
the definition of "security." 36 The basic principle enunciated
and relied upon has come to be known as the "economic real-
ity" test, wherein the focus of inquiry is placed upon the ac-
tual substance of the sale transaction.7
Finally, the court dismissed the cases cited by the plain-
tiffs in support of their position. Two of the three cases enu-
merated, Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk38 and Occidental Life
Insurance Co. of North Carolina v. Pat Ryan & Associates,
Inc., 9 were of minimal precedential value because they were
33. Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126 (2d Cir.
1976).
34. Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973). The language was
construed in effect to mandate an examination of the factual context in which the
transaction occurred before the issue could be fully resolved.
35. 637 F.2d at 1150 (quoting Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143
U.S. 457, 459 (1892): "'[A] thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not
within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers.' ")
36. The court referred to the Forman decision and its progeny in succeeding case
law. See generally United Housing Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975);
Chandler v. Kew [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) % 96,966 (10th Cir.
April 19, 1977); Bula v. Mansfield [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
96,964 (D. Colo. May 13, 1977). (The decision in Bula was rendered just one month
after Chandler and involved an attempted purchase of a restaurant through the ac-
quisition of all the stock of the parent company. As in Chandler, the stock was held
to constitute a mere indicia of ownership of the restaurant.)
37. In Forman, the Supreme Court conducted a two-step analysis: (1) economic
substance versus form of transaction; (2) compliance with the "investment contract"
test set out in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 421 U.S. at 848.
38. 484 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
39. 496 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023 (1974). The plaintiff
agreed to sell the outstanding stock of its subsidiary to the defendant. After the clos-
ing, both parties became dissatisfied and Occidental sued for breach of contract in
state court, but the defendant removed to federal court alleging, among other things,
1982]
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rendered prior to the Forman decision. The third case cited,
Coffin v. Polishing Machines, Inc.,4" was decided after For-
man but nevertheless was distinguishable upon its facts. The
notable difference in Coffin was that the sale of corporate
stock was utilized as a means of raising capital for profit-mak-
ing purposes, which was clearly not the scenario in the
Frederiksen case. The Frederiksen court summarized by de-
claring: "The 'stock' sale was a method used to vest ECC with
ownership of that business. There was no offer of investment
'securities.' 
"41
D. Economic Reality Test
Next, the court scrutinized the plaintiffs' assertions that
the transaction in question satisfied the requirements of the
"economic reality" test announced in Forman. In Forman, the
Supreme Court modified the test set out in SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co.42 by holding that proof of the existence of a secur-
ity involved only three elements: (1) an investment in a com-
mon venture; (2) premised on a reasonable expectation of
profits; (3) which were to be derived from the entrepreneurial
or managerial efforts of others.43 The Frederiksen court took
issue with the plaintiffs' claim that the first and third ele-
ments of this analysis were satisfied.
Mr. Frederiksen and ECC argued that there was an invest-
ment in a common venture because the employment agree-
ment with the defendant entitled him to twenty percent of
the gross profits of NSM and because Mr. Poloway continued
violation of the '34 Act. Emphasizing the motive of the defendant, the purchase was
held to be a securities transaction because the defendant had a desire to buy an en-
terprise with a good reputation in order to expand its business.
40. 596 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979). In Coffin, the dis-
trict court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals revered by holding that Forman required application
of the investment contract analysis only when the stock did not meet the traditional
characteristics test. 59 F.2d at 1204 (quoting Forman, 421 U.S. at 849).
41. 637 F.2d at 1151.
42. 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). Howey is the leading decision disregarding form for
substance so as to require application of federal securities provisions. In determining
whether a sales scheme involved a security, the now classic "investment contract"
formula established the definition of a security as being: (1) an investment of money;
(2) in a common enterprise; (3) with an expectation of profits; (4) to come soley from
the efforts of others.
43. 421 U.S. at 852.
[Vol. 65:487
SECURITIES LAW
to be a shareholder in NSM.4 ' The court summarily dismissed
this argument, referring to the test for a common enterprise
as asserted in Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc.45 Mr.
Poloway was deemed to have been a mere employee of ECC,
not a participant who shred in the profits of the enterprise.
The receipt of partial compensation in the form of a commis-
sion on sales did not transform the employment contract into
a securities investment.
The key to determining the presence of a common enter-
prise was held to be the degree of control retained by the in-
vestor over the factors contributing to the venture's ultimate
success." As a consequence, the particular method utilized in
determining the precise degree of control retained by the in-
vestor over the factors contributing to the venture's ultimate
success would be crucial to an effective analysis. The court ex-
amined such relevant factors as: (1) investor expertise, (2)
prior relationship of the parties and (3) economic feasibility of
exploitation of the seller.47
Next, the Frederiksen court addressed the third element
of the "economic reality" test - that profits be derived from
the efforts of others. The plaintiffs argued that, due to their
inexperience in the business of selling and servicing boats,
they had completely relied upon the defendant's managerial
efforts and expertise. Discrediting the plaintiffs' argument,
the court examined materials in the record" and held that
they indicated an assumption of management by ECC without
complete reliance on Mr. Poloway.
In addition, the employment relationship created with Mr.
Poloway was held to be legally insufficient to meet the
44. See summary of "employment" and "stock purchase" agreements, supra note
11.
45. 561 F.2d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1977) (a "sharing or pooling of funds" is required to
satisfy the test for a common enterprise).
46. See Tcherepin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 338 (1967).
47. A significant problem associated with the use of the phrase "common enter-
prise" is that the adjective "common" connotes plurality and poses the question of
whether there must be a minimum number of investors in the enterprise. See Le
Chateau Royal Corp. v. Pantaleo, 370 So. 2d 1155, 1157 (Fla. Ct. App. 1979); see also
Hannan & Thomas, The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Fed-
eral Securities, 25 HASTINGS L. J. 219, 246 (1974).
48. These materials included: (1) the employment agreement; (2) the plaintiffs'
motion to disqualify the defendant's counsel; (3) an affidavit attached to the plain-




"source-of-profits" requirement.49 Citing the measuring stan-
dard pronounced in SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises,50
the court reasoned that ECC expected, and by contract re-
quired, the defendant to give his "best efforts" and "exper-
tise" to NSM and ECC. But as an employee, Mr. Poloway was
not responsible for "'essential managerial decisions'" affect-
ing the conduct of the business since his efforts were specified
to be within the goals and directives of ECC.5 1
Characterization of the nature or quality of managerial ef-
forts must be considered in light of the other components of
the Howey test and the policy advanced by the federal securi-
ties acts. The common theme underlying this test is the de-
gree of control retained by the purchaser over the potential
success of his investment. In this respect, the distinction be-
tween profit expectation and consumption is predicated upon
investor control. Thus, Mr. Frederiksen's possession and per-
sonal exploitation of his investment gave rise to the inference
of a consumptive rather than profit-seeking motive.
This categorization is also consistent with the purposes of
the federal securities laws - full disclosure and prevention of
fraud.5 2 Where the purchaser is in control he may lose the
right to the disclosure of all relevant information affecting the
success of the enterprise. 53 The right of control held by Mr.
Frederiksen and his consequent access to information placed
him in a more favorable position than most purchasers to de-
49. Id.
50. 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). The court
there affirmed an order granting the SEC a preliminary injunction prohibiting the
offering and selling of public contracts characterized as self-improvement courses.
The test of the reliance element was whether the efforts of others are undeniably
significant ones which affect the failure or success of the enterprise. Accord, Lino v.
City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 692 (3d Cir. 1973) (quoting Securities Act Release
No. 521-1 (1971)).
51. 637 F.2d at 1153 (quoting Turner Enterprises, 474 F.2d at 482). Even if this
transaction had intermingled security and nonsecurity aspects, the Supreme Court
has made it clear that the interest obtained must have, "to a very substantial degree,
the elements of an investment contract." International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 (1979).
52. For a synopsis of the relation of the '33 and '34 Acts see 1 A. BROMBERG & L.
LOWENFELS, SECURITIEs FRAUD AND COMMODITIEs FRAUD § 4.6 (1979).
53. See Hirsh v. DuPont, 396 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (where the investor
obtains managerial control and thereby gains access to information about the seller,
he has less need of the protection provided by securities laws).
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termine whether he was defrauded. From this perspective, he
had a superior opportunity to minimize his losses and quickly
recoup any loss occasioned by any earlier failure to detect the
alleged fraud.
Finding the transaction was not within the purview of the
federal securities laws, the court held that the district court
was without subject matter jurisdiction and had properly dis-
missed the plaintiff's pendent claims. 4
II. EFFECT OF THE DECISION
The holding of the Frederiksen court exemplifies a strict
application of the Howey test, viewed in light of the Forman
decision. The ruling evidenced rejection of a purely mechani-
cal approach.5 The well-written opinion of Circuit Judge
Specker urged that a qualitative rather than a quantitative
analysis of purchaser participation be utilized to substantively
gauge the existence of a security.
This approach appears continuously to produce anamalous
results. For example, an instrument may be a security at one
time but not at another; the definition of the instrument be-
comes totally dependent upon the type of transaction in-
volved. Furthermore, some instruments may be deemed secur-
ities while other financial devices of an identical class and
issuer will not since each would be classified according to its
own trading patterns.56 Both stringent and diluted applica-
tions of the Howey test are vulnerable to a significant criti-
cism implicit in the observation that the federal securities
laws protect sellers as well as purchasers as mandated by rule
10b-557 and section 14(e).58 Since both parties are protected, a
test that reaches different results depending upon which initi-
ates the lawsuit obviously frustrates the underlying purpose of
the federal securities laws.
54. A federal court cannot exercise pendent jurisdiction where the court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal claims. United Mine Workers of America v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). This principle was applied by the courts in the
Chandler and Forman cases to dismiss the plaintiffs' pendent claims.
55. "The statutory policy of affording broad protection to investors is not to be
thwarted by unrealistic and irrelevant formulae." SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293,
301 (1946).
56. Hannan & Thomas, supra note 47.
57. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981), reprinted in 3 FED. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 1 26,744
(1980). For cases discussing the burden of proof under rule 10b-5 see supra note 6.
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
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It appears that federal courts have chiseled a hairline dis-
tinction between "instrument-based" and "transaction-based"
sales whereby a unique solution results each time the Howey
test is applied. A potentially viable alternative for determin-
ing the parties' need for protection would be to rely totally
upon the nature of both the issue and the instrument.5"
Several Supreme Court decisions have given indications of
a desire to restrict the scope of the securities laws to the pur-
poses for which they were designed.6 0 Since the Howey invest-
ment contract formula was structured to effectuate the pur-
poses of the securities acts,6' it will suffice, for the moment, as
the appropriate standard. However, the inherent ambiguity of
the test affects state blue sky law62 adjudications since state
statutory definitions of a "security" are generally interpreted
by reference to federal case law construction of the term. Not-
withstanding the revised form of the Howey test, the door is
still open to the development of basic principles in the area of
the law and the welcome mat is still out.63
ULICE PAYNE, JR.
59. FitzGibbon, What is a Security?: - A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to
Participate in the Financial Markets, 64 MINN. L. REv. 893, 910 (1980).
60. See Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securi-
ties Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 GEO. L.J. 891 (1977).
61. Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a Meaningful
Formula?, 18 W. Ras. L. REv. 367, 373 (1967).
62. The Supreme Court has held that the federal securities laws should not ex-
tend to such sale transactions because state regulation of bulk transfers under ch. 6 of
the Uniform Commercial Code already governs this area. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
63. Subsequent case law uniformly applies the Frederiksen rationale. See Canfield
v. Rapp & Son, Inc., 654 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1981); Reprosystem B.V. v. SCM Corp.,
522 F. Supp. 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Golden v. Garafalo, 521 F. Supp. 350 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); Somogyi v. Buttler, 518 F. Supp. 970 (D.N.J. 1981); Zilker v. Klein, 510 F.
Supp. 1070 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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